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Confronting the Evolving Safety and Security Challenge at 
Colleges and Universities 
OREN R. GRIFFIN∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Colleges and universities have long been scrutinized and confronted 
with lawsuits regarding safety and security measures designed and imple-
mented to protect students and prevent dangerous incidents on campus.1  
Under the doctrine of in loco parentis, college administrators assume re-
sponsibility for the physical safety and well-being of students as they ma-
triculate through their academic programs.2  However, in recent decades, 
the realization that university communities are not immune to criminal 
activity has led to federal legislation and judicial opinions that have at-
tempted to identify what legal duty colleges and universities have to pre-
vent security breaches.  Moreover, college and university administrators 
have looked to the courts and legal counsel to determine an institution’s 
exposure to legal liability and strategies that might be used to minimize 
such exposure.  This charge has been, and remains, a daunting challenge 
for the higher education community.  This Article reviews recent cases 
regarding the legal duty American colleges and universities have to protect 
the student community from harm or injury resulting from safety or secu-
rity breaches.  Moreover, this Article identifies legal challenges colleges 
and universities may face in response to campus surveillance efforts and 
negligence hiring and retention allegations.  Finally, the Article offers 
some insight intended to advance the legal community’s efforts to counsel 
and advise college and university administrators regarding the issue of 
campus safety. 
    ∗    Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. 
 1. United States v. Sykes, 58 F. 1000 (W.D.N.C. 1893) (university president’s failure to protect the 
moral habits of students constitutes culpable negligence); Stockwell v. Trs. of Stanford Univ., 148 P.2d 
405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944) (Stanford University liable for not taking adequate measures to ensure student 
safety from problem regarding use of BB guns on campus); Howe v. Ohmart, 33 N.E. 466 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1893) (affirming jury verdict against church-affiliated college holding that college had a duty to 
protect visitor from dangerous pitfalls on campus premises); Tennessee ex rel. Brown v. McCanless, 
195 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1946) (affirming the denial of a liquor license that would permit the sale of 
intoxicating liquor 700 feet from the Fisk University entrance gate because it was a totally inappropri-
ate place for such business).  
 2. Brian Jackson, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal 
for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135 (1991). 
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The principal federal legislation designed to address security and 
safety in higher education is the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Secu-
rity Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act3 (Clery Act), a part of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965.  The Clery Act requires colleges and uni-
versities to disclose annual information about campus crime statistics to 
students and parents.4  The crime statistics disclosure requirements have 
made a valuable contribution to campus security by bringing notable atten-
tion to issues of campus crime and security in the higher education com-
munity.  Colleges and universities failing to comply with the Clery Act’s 
requirements may be subject to certain penalties for not providing com-
plete and accurate statistical information about criminal incidents.  How-
ever, there are still important questions about the effectiveness of safety 
and security efforts on campuses across the country and about how the 
legal community can assist higher education administrators in this effort.  
There are numerous tragic and troubling incidents that provide ample 
reason for colleges and universities to examine, and possibly reconsider, 
the existing campus safety paradigm or model.  The August 1990 murders 
of five college students near the University of Florida serve as a grim re-
minder that college campuses can be the scene of heinous crimes.5  At 
Stony Brook University in New York, campus officials were compelled to 
increase day and night patrols around residence halls when students re-
ported that three unidentified men—whose faces were covered by ban-
danas, and who were also armed with a handgun and a knife—stormed a 
dorm room and made off with cash and other property.6  Meanwhile, offi-
cials at Washington State University (WSU) were forced to respond to a 
decision by a local court prohibiting police from patrolling WSU’s resi-
dence halls because the patrols violated student privacy rights.7  
While the Clery Act and other legislative efforts have provided impor-
tant information to students, parents, and faculties, many colleges and uni-
versities remain saddled with important questions regarding the scope and 
effectiveness of their campus safety efforts.  How far should university 
administrators be prepared to intrude in an effort to prevent criminal activ-
ity on campus?  What privacy compromises should students, faculties, and 
staff be expected to make in the interest of campus safety?  Are campus 
security personnel properly trained and deployed to prevent criminal activ-
  
 3. 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (f) (2006). 
 4. Bonnie S. Fisher et al., Making Campuses Safer for Students: The Clery Act as a Symbolic Legal 
Reform, 32 STETSON L. REV. 61 (2002). 
 5. Mary Shedden, No Fame for a Killer, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 13, 2006, § Nation/World, at 1.  Also, 
university campuses such as the University of Iowa, University of Arizona, and Duquesne University 
have been the scenes of numerous shootings. 
 6. Olivia Winslow, Stony Brook University Beefs up Security, NEWSDAY, May 11, 2006, at A40. 
 7. Judge Rules Police Dorm Patrols Violate Privacy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 10, 2006. 
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ity?  Is there a one-size-fits-all approach to campus security?  How can 
college administrators determine whether their approach to campus secu-
rity is effective?  What principles should guide security efforts to ensure 
that exposure to legal liability is minimized?  These questions demand 
attention from policy development personnel and the legal community 
because the safety and security challenges that confront higher education 
are formidable, complex, and likely to grow in the coming years. 
II. THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INSTITUTION AND THE 
STUDENT COMMUNITY 
Prior to the civil unrest experienced on college and university cam-
puses across the country in the 1960s, the doctrine of in loco parentis ex-
tended to institutions of higher learning the authority to exercise parental 
control over students enrolled at colleges and universities.8  Today, the 
doctrine of in loco parentis has disappeared from college life, and students 
are considered adult consumers free to engage in various activities at their 
own discretion.9  Arguably, the dismissal of the in loco parentis doctrine 
led to two viewpoints that characterize the relationship between students 
and the modern-day college or university.  
One viewpoint contends that the student and the university have an 
arms-length relationship that acknowledges that students have the same 
exclusive right to exercise independent judgment over their own affairs as 
reserved to any adult.10  The other viewpoint maintains that the university-
student relationship is unique and imposes a duty on the university to exer-
cise reasonable care to protect students from harm.11
In Furek, the Delaware Supreme Court found that a university could be 
liable for physical injuries a student sustained during a fraternity hazing 
incident because the relationship between the university and the student 
was sufficiently close and direct to impose a duty to protect the student 
from foreseeable dangerous activities occurring on the premises.12  The 
  
 8. Jackson, supra note 2. 
 9. See Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that since the late 1970s, 
many legal scholars and jurisdictions have recognized that no special relationship exists between a 
college and its own students because the college is not an insurer of the safety of its students). 
 10. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979) (rejecting the notion that a university 
has a duty to protect students from injury caused by a third party under the in loco parentis doctrine or 
under sections 314A or 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 
(1980); Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) (same). 
 11. Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 516-19 (Del. 1991); see Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 
N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983) (university has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to students 
due to the uniqueness of the student-university relationship, and existing social values and customs). 
 12. Furek, 594 A.2d at 522. 
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court in Furek rejected the reasoning in Bradshaw and Beach, noting that 
both cases applied flawed logic.  Specifically, in Bradshaw and Beach, the 
university argued that it had no duty to supervise its students because they 
were responsible adults.13  However, both cases involved alcohol con-
sumption by students below the legal drinking age, which undermined any 
contention that the students were responsible adults. 
Contrary to the reasoning in Bradshaw and Beach, the Furek court rec-
ognized the “the unique situation created by the concentration of young 
people on a college campus and the ability of the university to protect its 
students.”14  The court did not resurrect the in loco parentis doctrine and 
agreed that the university’s duty was limited to the regulation and supervi-
sion of foreseeable dangerous activities occurring on its property, but re-
jected the university’s argument that it had no duty to protect its students 
from others.15
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not crafted a brightline rule that a 
university has a duty to protect its students, many jurisdictions continue to 
wrestle with the question of whether a special relationship exists between 
the university and its students that establishes that the university has a legal 
duty to protect students.16  Apart from the special relationship debate, at 
least one jurisdiction has questioned whether a student is an invitee to 
which a university would owe a legal duty to use reasonable and ordinary 
care to protect the student-invitee from harm.  In Rhaney v. University of 
Maryland Eastern Shore,17 the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed a jury 
verdict entered by the circuit court in favor of Anthony Rhaney, a student 
at the University of Maryland Eastern Shore (UMES), who was assaulted 
by his dorm roommate.18   
  
 13. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 142; Beach, 726 P.2d at 419. 
 14. Furek, 594 A.2d at 519. 
 15. Id. at 521. 
 16. Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 2003).  In Webb v. University of Utah, 125 P.3d 
906 (Utah 2005), the Utah Supreme Court revisited the issue of whether a university had a legal duty to 
exercise ordinary and reasonable care when it directs students to engage in specific activities as part of 
its educational instruction.  Webb involved a suit brought by a student who was injured during a science 
class field trip when the student was directed by his instructor to walk on an icy and snowy sidewalk.  
The class instructor required students to enter a dangerous area where the plaintiff and other students 
fell and were injured.  Despite the court’s previous decision in Beach, it held that a special relationship 
could be created between the instructor and the student because, in the academic environment, students 
do relinquish a degree of behavioral autonomy out of deference to their instructors.  Such a special 
relationship could establish that a university owed a legal duty of care to students and lay the founda-
tion for a successful negligence claim.  However, based on the pleadings presented by the plaintiff, the 
instructor’s directive for students to walk on the icy sidewalk did not create a special relationship 
because the students were not exposed to unreasonable risk of harm by the instructor’s conduct.  Thus, 
the university’s rule 12(b) motion to dismiss was granted.  Id. at 910-11. 
 17. 880 A.2d 357 (Md. 2005). 
 18. Id. at 368. 
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Rhaney was assaulted on October 29, 1998, while his roommate, Ennis 
Clark, was moving his belongings to another dorm room.  As Clark was 
moving, Rhaney began to rearrange the dorm room and attempted to move 
Clark’s fish tank.  Clark returned to discover that the tank was cracked and 
leaking.  After they exchanged words about the leaking fish tank, Clark 
punched Rhaney in the jaw.  Rhaney argued that the university knew Clark 
had a history of violence because he had been involved in two prior fights 
on campus, but permitted Clark to return to UMES.  The university argued, 
as Rhaney’s landlord, that it violated no known duty to Rhaney as a busi-
ness invitee and that no special relationship existed between UMES and 
Rhaney.  Therefore, UMES submitted that Rhaney could not establish a 
negligence claim as a matter of law. 19
After the trial court denied UMES’s motion for summary judgment, 
the jury returned a verdict for Rhaney and awarded him $74,385 in com-
pensatory damages.  The jury found that UMES breached a duty of reason-
able care owed to Rhaney and that breach was the proximate cause of 
Rhaney’s injuries.  The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the 
jury’s verdict finding that there was insufficient evidence available to es-
tablish that the dormitory assault was foreseeable.  The court refused to 
consider whether a special relationship existed because Rhaney failed to 
plead that theory.20  The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, 
recognizing that absent a special relationship the university had no duty to 
control the conduct of a third person to prevent her from causing physical 
harm by criminal acts or intentional torts.21  As Rhaney’s landlord, UMES 
had a duty of reasonable care to protect against known, or reasonably fore-
seeable risks, but the court refused to characterize Rhaney’s dormitory 
roommate as a dangerous condition.22         
More importantly, the court found that Rhaney was not a business in-
vitee at the time of the assault.  The court explained: 
[b]eyond his matriculation generally as a student at UMES, 
Rhaney’s specific contractual relationship with UMES as to his 
occupancy of the dormitory room was governed by a distinct 
“Residence Hall Agreement.”  Rhaney, while inside the dormitory 
building, was a tenant of a landlord, but not necessarily a business 
invitee.  Business invitees are visitors invited to enter the premises 
in connection with some business dealings with the possessor.23
  
 19. Id. at 360. 
 20. Id. at 363. 
 21. Id. at 364. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 367. 
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The court further observed that Rhaney was a business invitee in 
common areas on the UMES campus, but upon entering the dormitory, his 
legal status was specifically regulated by the Residence Hall Agreement.  
Thus, according to the Maryland Court of Appeals, Rhaney was a tenant at 
the time of the assault, not a business invitee.24   
The difficulty with the analysis applied in Rhaney is that colleges and 
universities view dorms as not only shelter for students, but also as safe 
havens for students to explore learning and continue their development.25  
Extracurricular programs are held in dorms, which can make them just as 
important as any academic building on campus.26  Given the vital role that 
dorms play in accomplishing the academic mission of a college or univer-
sity, it is illogical that a student’s legal status as an invitee would be dimin-
ished by choosing to live on-campus.27
III. UNDERSTANDING THE ANALYSIS APPLIED TO DETERMINE WHETHER A 
COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY OWES A DUTY OF CARE TO ITS STUDENT 
COMMUNITY 
Whether an institution has proposed and implemented strategies and 
tactics that will be viewed by courts as appropriate measures to allow a 
college or university to avoid legal liability can never be certain, and likely 
will be determined on a case-by-case basis.  However, recent tort cases 
suggest that the pivotal inquiry is whether an institution has a legal duty to 
protect its students from harm and, if so, what is the scope of such duty. 
A negligence claim successfully defended by Wilmington College il-
lustrates how courts may limit an institution’s duty to protect students from 
harm when the student’s activities are not under the college’s exclusive 
control.  In Ingato v. Beisel,28 the Wilmington College aviation manage-
ment-flight program required students to obtain FAA certifications in both 
the visual and the instrument operations of an aircraft to complete the de-
gree program.  Because the college did not offer flight-training instruction, 
students were left to contract with a flight-training school to acquire the 
  
 24. Id. 
 25. GREGORY S. BLIMLING & LAWRENCE J. MILTENBERGER, THE RESIDENT ASSISTANT: WORKING 
WITH COLLEGE STUDENTS IN RESIDENCE HALLS 21-25 (2d ed. 1981). 
 26. Id.  
 27. First year fulltime students at institutions such as Vanderbilt University, Duke University, West 
Virginia University, and a host of other institutions are required to live on campus in residence halls or 
dormitories.  See Harlan Cohen, The Importance of Being There: Commuter Students Risk Missing Out 
on Crucial Learning Experiences, WALL ST. J.: CLASSROOM EDITION, Oct. 2002, available at 
www.wsjclassroom.com/archive/02oct/COLOG_OCT.htm. 
 28. No. Civ. A. 03C05087SCD, 2005 WL 578814 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2005). 
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required FAA certifications.  Several flight-training schools were located 
near the college, but none of the flight-training schools, including the Sky 
Safety, Inc. (Sky Safety) flight-training school, were affiliated or under the 
control of Wilmington College.  In spring 2001, John Ingato, a Wilmington 
College student in the Management-Flight Program, enrolled at Sky Safety 
to obtain his FAA certifications.29  
During an instructional flight, the student was injured when his plane 
crashed while attempting to land.  Evidence presented established that the 
crash was caused by the negligence of the flight instructor, and Ingato sued 
Sky Safety for damages.  The student-plaintiff also sued the college based 
on the contention that the college directed him to Sky Safety as part of its 
academic degree requirements.30
The college denied that it directed Ingato to Sky Safety for flight train-
ing, and the court found no evidence that the college assumed any duty or 
exercised any control over Sky Safety.  The training did not take place on 
the property of the college and there was no indication that the college 
attempted to become involved with flight training whatsoever.  Moreover, 
the court held that no duty was created by the college’s requirement that 
some degree program activities take place off-campus.  Therefore, Wil-
mington College’s motion for summary judgment was granted.31
While the court found that Wilmington College was not liable for neg-
ligence because the college had no duty to provide for the safety of stu-
dents taking flight-instruction classes at Sky Safety, there can be little ar-
gument that the student was compelled to take the flight-instruction train-
ing to meet the college’s degree requirements.  Should a college or univer-
sity have a responsibility to its students who are compelled to engage with 
outside entities to complete their degree requirements?  Is a college’s re-
sponsibility or duty to such students even more evident when the instruc-
tional subject matter involves dangerous or risky undertakings, like flight 
training or working with hazardous materials?  Or, should colleges and 
universities refrain from becoming entangled in the affairs of students out-
side the campus to avoid assuming a responsibility for the students’ safety 
that might not otherwise exist?32
Arguably, Wilmington College’s motion for summary judgment was 
successful because the college exercised no control over Sky Safety’s 
  
 29. Id. at *2.  Although not discussed in the court’s decision, it appears that the college may have 
created a captive market for the flight training schools.  Id.   
 30. Id. at *3. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Stephenson v. Coll. Misericordia, 376 F. Supp. 1324 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (finding that the 
college was not vicariously liable for injuries sustained by a student taking a horseback riding class at 
an equestrian center that was not operated by the college to complete certain physical education re-
quirements). 
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flight-instruction program.  The outcome of this case, moreover, discour-
ages institutional administrators from investigating third parties and ven-
dors that target students for services needed to complete academic pro-
grams.  This may be an effective risk avoidance strategy, but whether such 
an approach is in the best interest of higher education is uncertain. 
In McClure v. Fairfield University,33 the plaintiff, a freshman at Fair-
field University, was struck by a car driven by another student returning 
from a nearby beach party who had been drinking just before 2:00 a.m. on 
September 12, 1998.34  The plaintiff, along with other students, left the 
university hours earlier to attend a party held off-campus near a popular 
residential beach area.  The university knew that the off-campus residential 
beach community was frequently the site of parties attended by university 
students and that alcohol was often available to students.35  For several 
years prior to this incident, Student Government Association volunteers 
were allowed to use university-owned vehicles as part of the group’s “Safe 
Rides” program.36  The Safe Rides program provided students transporta-
tion from the beach area to campus on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday 
nights.37
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965),38 the court rea-
soned that the university assumed responsibility for the safety of the plain-
tiff by providing the transportation services for students between the beach 
area and campus.39  
While the Safe Rides program may have been a well-intentioned alter-
native for students returning to campus from parties at the Fairfield town 
beach area, in this case, the shuttle services formed the basis for finding 
that the university had a legal duty to protect students returning from the 
beach area for parties.  Hence, institutions that implement safety measures 
may be assuming far great responsibility than intended.  McClure arguably 
indicates that certain disincentives extend to colleges and universities that 
apply innovative safety measures or partner with student groups in the in-
terest of safety.   
  
 33. 2004 WL 203001, No. CV000159028S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 2004). 
 34. Id. at *2. 
 35. Id. at *10-12.   
 36. Id. 
 37. The evidence indicated that the Safe Rides program was made available in the best interest of 
student safety.  However, the service was offered on a limited basis and only when student volunteers 
were available to drive the vans.  Id. at *12. 
 38. Section 323 addresses the duty owed by one who assumes direct responsibility for the safety of 
another through the rendering of services in the area of protection. 
 39. McClure v. Fairfield Univ., No. CV000159028S, 2004 WL 203001, at *22-24 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 14, 2004). 
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The Superior Court of Connecticut may have denied the university’s 
motion for summary judgment, but the university’s willingness to embrace 
the Student Government Association’s volunteer effort and make vans 
available to transport students from beach area parties was prudent and 
responsible.  The unfortunate reality is that the court’s opinion in this case 
may discourage the implementation of an innovative and collaborative 
security measure at colleges and universities due to the tort-liability threat.  
In Rogers v. Delaware State University,40 the court granted a motion 
for summary judgment filed by Delaware State University (DSU) in a law-
suit brought by a student to recover damages for injuries the student sus-
tained as a result of a targeted attack.  The court found, inter alia, that the 
student was the victim of an unforeseeable ambush and that the university 
had no duty to protect the student from such an incident.41  The events 
leading to the student’s injuries began when a female student fleeing her 
ex-boyfriend asked the plaintiff-student to drive her to the police station.  
Later that same evening, the plaintiff was shot in the face by the ex-
boyfriend who suspected that the plaintiff-student and the female student 
had a personal relationship.42
The plaintiff’s initial encounter with the female student and the subse-
quent shooting happened at a motel the university was using as overflow 
student housing.43  The plaintiff had applied for on-campus student hous-
ing, but because of excessive demand, numerous students, including the 
plaintiff, were placed in supplemental housing at off-campus locations.  
There was no dispute that the university maintained an obligation to pro-
vide reasonable safety measures at the motel location, which housed stu-
dents.44  However, the facts in this case led the court to find that the plain-
tiff’s injuries were caused by an unforeseeable targeted attack, and as such, 
the university had no duty to protect the plaintiff.45
In its analysis of the negligence issue, the court opined that whether the 
university had a legal duty to protect the plaintiff was dependent on the 
relationship between the university and the student, and the foreseeable 
consequences implicated by the relationship question.  “[T]here can be no 
duty to prevent an unforeseeable harm even where there may be a general 
duty to protect.”46  Hence, the court found that the key factor in the case 
was the foreseeability of the harm.47
  
 40. No. Civ. A. 03C-03-218-PLA, 2005 WL 2462271 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 2005).   
 41. Id. at *6. 
 42. Id. at *1. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at *6.  
 45. Id. at *7. 
 46. Id. at *4. 
 47. Id. at *5. 
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Relying on Furek, the court reasoned that the university did not stand 
in loco parentis to its students, but the university did owe its student a lim-
ited duty of care.48  For instance, it would be reasonable to expect that the 
university provide security services to students living in on-campus hous-
ing and those students temporarily housed in off-campus locations.  How-
ever, this expectation does not mean that the university assumed an abso-
lute duty to ensure a student’s safety.  The university was not notified that 
the plaintiff was involved in a confrontation earlier in the day, nor did the 
plaintiff inform the campus police department of the incident.  Thus, the 
university had no duty to protect the plaintiff because it was unforeseeable 
that he would be attacked later that same evening.49
The Rogers decision invites an examination of the level of protection 
that the college or university community should expect from the campus 
police department.  What is the function of the police and security person-
nel deployed on college and university campuses?  Is it to relieve local law 
enforcement officials from patrolling campus grounds and facilities and 
place all policing responsibilities within the institution’s jurisdiction?  Or, 
is it to provide a heightened level of security to members of the campus 
community not routinely available to the general public?   
While the decision in Rogers may be correct because security patrols 
may not have stopped a jealous ex-boyfriend, there is reason to speculate 
as to whether on-campus housing might have provided a safer haven for 
the student in comparison to a motel.  Students choose, and some are re-
quired, to live on-campus to minimize their exposure to harm and/or avail 
themselves of the purportedly safe campus environment.  For these stu-
dents and their parents, the Clery Act requires colleges and universities to 
disclose information regarding campus crime statistics, which may allow 
for a more informed assessment as to the relative safety of a college cam-
pus.50  Whether DSU is liable for the student’s injuries can be debated, but 
the tragedy is that a student was shot, and despite a prior confrontation and 
even the student’s concerns that trouble could result, the campus police 
department was not involved until it was too late.  
In Johnson v. Alcorn State University,51 the mother of a deceased stu-
dent and another student who sustained gunshot injuries in an altercation 
  
 48. Id. at *5. 
 49. Id. at *6-7.  In response to the plaintiff’s argument that the university did not provide adequate 
security patrols at the off-campus housing location, the court again found against the student.  The 
court held that even if the university had a duty to protect the student from harm, the university’s fail-
ure to provide police patrols at the Dover Inn motel was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
injuries.  The court found that the attack upon the plaintiff came without warning and could not have 
been deterred by security patrols.  Id. at *7. 
 50. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006). 
 51. 929 So. 2d 398 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). 
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on the Alcorn State University campus sued the university for wrongful 
death and negligence.  The shooting came after Demetrice Williams and 
three of his friends, all non-students, visited the campus on October 8, 
2001.  That evening, a “non-Greek” step show was taking place on cam-
pus.  Williams did not log-in at the university’s Welcome Center pursuant 
to campus police department procedures.  Once on campus, Williams and 
his friends had a confrontation with several female students that resulted in 
a fight.  After this altercation, a student memorized Williams’ license plate 
number and gave it to Larry King, Dean of the Men’s Dormitory.  One of 
the female students—who was struck by a beer bottle while attempting to 
break up the fight—told her boyfriend about the fight with Williams.  Min-
utes later, the boyfriend, Roddell Devoual, and his friend Jekeley Johnson 
returned to the scene of the fight looking for Williams.  Williams was rec-
ognized by one of the female students, and, in response, he immediately 
drew a pistol, shooting Devoual in the chest and fatally shooting Johnson 
in the head.  Williams was sentenced to a total of forty-three years in 
prison.52  
The circuit court found that the campus police department acted with 
reckless disregard as to the safety of the students because the police de-
partment did not follow the log-in procedures governing the admission of 
vehicles through the university’s Welcome Center.53  However, on appeal 
the court focused on causation and found that the plaintiffs could not estab-
lish the necessary causal connection.  Specifically, the court of appeals 
determined that there was no evidence that had an officer complied with 
the log-in procedure, the officer would have searched for a weapon or dis-
covered the weapon that was eventually used in the shooting.54  The plain-
tiffs also failed to show that the shooting was foreseeable, and the shooting 
represented a criminal act that served as a superceding cause that relieved 
the institution of liability.55  On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court 
and explained that the non-student’s decision to draw a pistol and shoot 
two students was the proximate cause of Johnson’s death and Devoual’s 
injuries.56
  
 52. Id. at 401-03. 
 53. Id. at 404. 
 54. Id. at 409. 
 55. Id. at 412-13.  
 56. Id. at 414. 
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IV. A SELECT REVIEW OF LIABILITY THEORIES THAT MAY INFLUENCE 
SECURITY EFFORTS ON CAMPUS: INVASION OF PRIVACY AND NEGLIGENT 
HIRING, SUPERVISION, AND RETENTION 
It is difficult to identify each cause of action that may confront a col-
lege or university as a result of a breach in security or shortcomings of the 
institution’s public safety protocols.  However, this Article shall address 
two areas that are likely to confront higher education administrators and 
legal counsel involved in managing campus security systems: privacy and 
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.  Legal claims in these areas 
have the potential to impact the entire university community, especially 
students and faculty.  Therefore, an institution should be prepared to scru-
tinize its tactics and strategies to ensure that exposure to these claims is 
kept to a minimum.  
A.  Invasion of Privacy  
While federal and state law enforcement agencies are expanding their 
efforts to combat terrorism, college and university administrators are seek-
ing to improve on-campus monitoring techniques to enhance campus secu-
rity.  Among the tools campus police and those administrators responsible 
for maintaining campus security are using with increasing frequency are 
video surveillance cameras, close circuit television (CCTV), and other 
technological monitoring strategies.  Administrators and legal counsel 
must be aware of the potential legal challenges that might result from the 
use of these surveillance devices.  For purposes of this Article, our discus-
sion regarding the invasion of privacy will focus on the use of surveillance 
cameras as a crime prevention and security method.   
The use of surveillance cameras can be subject to a constitutional chal-
lenge under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  To do so, a 
plaintiff alleges that the use of such cameras constitutes an illegal search or 
invasion of privacy.  The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides in pertinent part, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated . . . .”57  However, the Fourth Amendment pro-
  
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The U.S. Constitution prohibits not only unreasonable physical 
searches but also unreasonable technological searches.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
(listening and recording devices attached to the outside of public telephone booth to intercept telephone 
calls constitutes an unreasonable search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment); Cowles v. State, 23 
P.3d 1168, 1170 (Alaska 1991).  However, the framers of the Fourth Amendment obviously had in 
mind physical objects such as books, papers, letters, and other kinds of documents which they felt 
should not be seized by police officers except on the basis of limited search warrants issued by magis-
trates.  As early as 1928, the U.S. Supreme Court commented that the Constitution should be kept 
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hibition against an unreasonable search does not mean that the use of a 
video surveillance camera or other forms of technological monitoring 
automatically violates an individual’s constitutional rights.  First, there 
must be a determination that a person has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.  Absent a reasonable expectation of privacy, there can be no Fourth 
Amendment violation, regardless of the nature of the search. 
The general test used to determine whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists requires a plaintiff to show: (1) that she had a subjective 
expectation of privacy; and if so, (2) that the expectation is one that society 
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.58  In Thompson v. Johnson County 
Community College,59 security officers employed at the Community Col-
lege filed a lawsuit in response to a decision by a supervisor to install video 
recorders in a locker room that also served as a storage room.  The court 
held that the security officers had no expectation of privacy in the 
locker/storage room because the room was not enclosed, and their activi-
ties could have been viewed by anyone walking through the storage area.60  
Relying on the decision in United States v. Taketa,61 the court noted that 
video surveillance “in public places . . . does not violate the fourth amend-
ment; police may record what they normally may view with the naked 
eye.”62
The plaintiffs in Thompson could not satisfy part one of the test, nor 
could they have met part two.  The second part requires the court to bal-
ance the individual’s expectation of privacy against the need for “supervi-
sion, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.”63  Put another 
way, part two of the test is a value judgment: “whether, if the particular 
form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated 
by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining 
to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of 
a free and open society.”64  Therefore, surveillance cameras used on col-
lege campuses for security purposes are not likely to violate the Fourth 
Amendment if: (1) the cameras are focused on public areas that would be 
in plain view and not in areas exclusively understood to be private, such as 
  
abreast of modern times and that wiretapping produced the same evil result that the framers had in 
mind when they adopted the Fourth Amendment.  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see 
EDWARD S. CORWIN & JACK W. PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION (7th ed. 1976). 
 58. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
 59. 930 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1996). 
 60. Id. at 507.  This is not to suggest that employees cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in areas such as restrooms, locker rooms, or closed offices.  See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 
(1987) (finding that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets). 
 61. 923 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 62. Thompson, 930 F. Supp. at 507 (quoting Taketa, 923 F.2d at 667). 
 63. Id. at 508. 
 64. Cowles v. State, 23 P.3d 1168, 1171 (Alaska 1991) (quotation omitted). 
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restrooms or changing areas; and (2) colleges and universities take prudent 
steps to notify students, faculty, and staff in advance about the cameras and 
their field of view.65   
For colleges and universities with unionized workforces, it is important 
to acknowledge that the use of surveillance cameras to monitor employees 
may be a mandatory subject of bargaining.  The National Labor Relations 
Board has held that the installation of surveillance cameras is germane to 
the working environment and outside the scope of managerial decisions 
lying at the core of entrepreneurial control.66  Thus, the installation of sur-
veillance cameras is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the test es-
tablished by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor 
Relations Board.67  
B.  Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention  
The cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of 
an employee has long been adopted by numerous jurisdictions based on the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 317.  The thrust of the tort is de-
signed to hold employers responsible for hiring decisions and failing to 
control the conduct of employees under the institution’s supervision.  The 
particular concerns for colleges and universities stem from the reality that 
these institutions employ a diverse workforce, from distinguished faculty 
to groundskeepers, and these employees are routinely placed at decentral-
ized locations across numerous buildings and facilities.  As a result, it is 
often difficult to effectively monitor and implement corrective action to 
prevent harm to others.  Hence, it is likely that colleges and universities 
have significant exposure to claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and 
retention.  
In Zimmer v. Ashland University,68 the court divided its ruling as to a 
student’s claim for negligent hiring and retention.  The plaintiff began her 
college education at Ashland University (AU), where she earned an ath-
letic scholarship as a member of the women’s swim team.69  The scholar-
  
 65. It is important to note that the first major electronic surveillance law was Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act passed in 1968.  However, the 1968 Act did not address video 
surveillance.  The Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986 allowed law enforcement to use 
video surveillance.  Other technological monitoring advances that may be used as security measures 
include CCTV systems and webcams.  The downside to these new technologies is that the law has not 
kept pace with the technology, which may create serious questions regarding the use of these devices as 
security measures on campus. 
 66. See Colgate Palmolive Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 515 (1997). 
 67. 441 U.S. 488 (1979); see also Nat’l Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 324 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 68. No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2001). 
 69. Id. at *4. 
2007 THE EVOLVING SAFETY AND SECURITY CHALLENGE 427 
ship provided the plaintiff with $9,000 of financial support.70  The plaintiff 
was initially coached by Coach Verge, who left after plaintiff’s freshman 
year.  Thereafter, AU interviewed and hired Seeman Baugh to coach the 
women’s swim team.71  
Almost from the outset of Coach Baugh’s tenure as the AU women’s 
swim coach, the plaintiff alleged that Coach Baugh repeatedly made sexual 
comments to her and inappropriately touched her.72  Following the 1998–
1999 season, the plaintiff and other members of the swimming team con-
fronted Coach Baugh about his conduct.  Members of the women’s swim 
team also held multiple meetings with the university’s athletics director.73  
In response, the athletics director sent a letter to Coach Baugh and held two 
meetings with the coach regarding the conduct reported by the plaintiff and 
the other student athletes.74  Despite these discussions and meetings, Coach 
Baugh continued to make inappropriate comments to the plaintiff.  At no 
time was Coach Baugh relieved of his coaching duties or responsibilities, 
and he remained at AU despite the complaints raised by the student ath-
letes.75  Based on the plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the situation at AU, 
she left for another university in 1999 and filed a lawsuit in 2001 for har-
assment, negligent hiring, and negligent retention, among other claims.  
Subsequently, a motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of the 
university, its athletics director, and Coach Baugh.76
Addressing plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim, the court noted that the 
plaintiff had to show: “(1) the existence of an employment relationship; (2) 
the employee’s incompetence; (3) the employer’s actual or constructive 
knowledge of such incompetence; (4) the employee’s act or omission caus-
ing plaintiff’s injury; (5) the employer’s negligence in hiring or retaining 
the employee as the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.”77  The court 
held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment as to the neg-
ligent hiring claim because there was no evidence that the university or its 
athletics director should have known of Coach Baugh’s tortious propensity.  
The hiring process used to hire Coach Baugh was sound.  A committee of 
faculty, students, and staff reviewed several applicants for the position and 
received positive references from two former employers regarding Coach 
  
 70. Id. at *9. 
 71. Id. at *4-5. 
 72. Id. at *5. 
 73. Id. at *7. 
 74. Id. at *7-8, *22. 
 75. Id. at *22. 
 76. Id. at *9-10. 
 77. Id. at *39. 
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Baugh’s abilities.78  Hence, the motion for summary judgment was granted 
as to the negligent hiring claim.  
However, the court denied the motion for summary judgment with re-
gard to the plaintiff’s negligent retention claim.  The court found that AU 
and the athletics director were aware of Coach Baugh’s harassing behavior 
prior to the plaintiff’s decision to leave AU.79  More specifically, the court 
found that the athletics director failed to follow university policy and ne-
glected to report the complaints—or the findings of his own investiga-
tion—to the proper university officials.80  Under these facts, the motion for 
summary judgment was properly denied because a jury could find that AU 
was negligent in retaining Coach Baugh.  Given the access that coaches, 
faculty, and staff have to students, it is apparent that failing to promptly 
respond to threatening conduct can easily expose colleges and universities 
to negligent retention claims.  In Zimmer, the university had sufficient rea-
son to know that the swim coach was likely to harm students on the 
women’s swim team.  In cases where the university has no actual or con-
structive knowledge of alleged wrongdoing, a negligent hiring and reten-
tion claim may not prevail. 
In Blavackas v. Worcester State College,81 a student filed a lawsuit 
against the college after he was injured in an auto accident caused by an-
other student, Hefferman, who was driving under the influence of alco-
hol.82  The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the college was liable for negli-
gent hiring and negligent supervision of its resident assistants and college 
police officers.83  Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Hefferman be-
came intoxicated at a party held in a dorm room at the college, and the 
resident assistant did not intervene to dismiss the party or prevent the 
drinking.  After becoming intoxicated, the college police were called to the 
scene and arrived as Hefferman attempted to drive away from the campus 
in his car.  The college police did not stop Hefferman from leaving the 
scene.84  
Massachusetts law provides that “[a]n employer whose employees are 
brought into contact with the public has a duty to exercise care in the selec-
tion and retention of employees or the employer may be liable to an injured 
third party under a theory of negligent hiring or negligent retention.”85  
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because 
  
 78. Id. at *37-38. 
 79. Id. at *39. 
 80. Id. at *23. 
 81. No. 95-02333, 1996 LEXIS 295 (Mass Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1996). 
 82. Id. at *1-2. 
 83. Id. at *7. 
 84. Id. at *2. 
 85. Id. at *7. 
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there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s contention that the college 
was negligent in hiring or training its housing staff or campus police.  
While an unauthorized party did take place in the dorm room, that fact 
alone was insufficient to support a claim that a resident assistant was neg-
ligently hired because the students voluntarily became intoxicated and the 
resident assistant was not present at the party.  Further, the campus police 
arrived on the scene as Hefferman was leaving the parking lot, which the 
court also found provided no support for the plaintiff’s negligent hiring 
claim.  Hence, the court found no evidence to confirm that the college was 
negligent in hiring or supervising its resident assistants or campus police.86
In contrast, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict 
for an employee who successfully alleged that a university was negligent 
in supervising and retaining its campus police chief, Paul White.  In Sabb 
v. South Carolina State University,87 a jury returned a verdict for $200,000 
in actual damages for a plaintiff against the university for claims of negli-
gent supervision and negligent retention of the university’s campus police 
chief.88  The evidence presented to the jury indicated that the plaintiff and 
other employees in the campus police department raised numerous con-
cerns and complaints regarding the police chief’s conduct.  A petition was 
signed by members of the police department explaining their concerns, and 
the university appointed a committee to investigate the matter.89  The 
plaintiff claimed that the campus police chief removed her job duties and 
denied her promotional opportunities.  Moreover, witnesses testified as to 
problems with the police chief’s personnel practices.  The witnesses also 
testified that the police chief told the plaintiff that she would not get a raise 
or promotion because she was unfit to be a police officer.90  
The court found that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s 
motions for a directed verdict and a JNOV.  The court indicated that the 
university was on notice about Chief White’s activities through the petition 
submitted by members of the department, grievances filed by the plaintiff, 
and the committee appointed to investigate Chief White’s conduct.91  “De-
spite these . . . actions and behavior, University allowed him to continue 
serving as chief of the department without any real effort to rectify the 
hostile conditions within the department.”92  Thus, consistent with the 
court’s holding in Zimmer, the plaintiff’s negligent retention claim was 
  
 86. Id. at *8. 
 87. 567 S.E.2d 231 (S.C. 2002). 
 88. Id. at 233. 
 89. Id. at 235. 
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 91. Id. at 237. 
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successful because the university had actual knowledge as to the em-
ployee’s incompetence and failed to take adequate corrective action.  
It is important to point out, however, that the Sabb decision also in-
cluded a vigorous dissent, which indicated that actions for negligent super-
vision and retention should require the plaintiff to prove that the offending 
employee committed an actionable tort.  Finding that Chief White’s con-
duct was not sufficiently egregious, the dissent warned that allowing re-
covery in this case would have grave consequences for the employer-
employee relationship going forward.  Employers would be faced with two 
options: “(1) fire the supervisor when a subordinate employee complains, 
or (2) retain the supervisor, and become liable for money damages if the 
complaining employee prevails on a negligent retention and supervision 
claim.”93  
As colleges and universities seek to hire and retain productive employ-
ees and separate the institution from those employees who are incompetent 
or have counter-productive motives, the negligent hiring, supervision, and 
retention tort will remain a viable threat.  The first line of defense will be 
to ensure that the institution has thorough, probing hiring procedures and 
practices that allow for a complete evaluation of candidates in the pre-
employment process before personnel enter the college or university com-
munity.  Next, the institution must be prepared to take action that ade-
quately responds to persons who represent a legitimate threat to the cam-
pus community.  Otherwise, the negligent retention claim may be particu-
larly difficult for colleges and universities to avoid and would require ad-
ministrators to be proactive when one’s conduct poses a threat to the larger 
university community.94  This can be particularly important for employees 
who have access to sensitive and/or confidential information.95  Neverthe-
less, whether the situation involves students, faculty, staff, or visitors, the 
  
 93. Id. at 239 (Pleicones, J. dissenting). 
 94. Negligence claims may be brought by parties only remotely related to the employers.  In Doe v. 
XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005), the court held that an employer had a duty to make 
sure that its employees did not operate as a risk to others.  Although this case involved an employee’s 
use of a workplace computer to distribute child pornography, the case gives some insight as to how an 
employer with access to its employee’s activities may be held liable when an employee engages in acts 
that violate public policy and the employer does nothing to prevent the misconduct. 
 95. While an employee terminated for poor conduct or job performance that may support a negligent 
retention claim can subsequently file a lawsuit for wrongful discharge, an institution that can demon-
strate that the employee’s conduct involved a clear breach of policy will be capable of successfully 
defending such lawsuits.  In Swigart v. Kent State University, No. 2004-P-0037, 2005 LEXIS 2139 
(Ohio Ct. App. May 6, 2005), the plaintiff was terminated after she released information regarding a 
student’s academic record to the campus newspaper.  The plaintiff understood the university’s policy 
that required the protection of confidential information contained in student records.  The court af-
firmed plaintiff’s termination because of the intentional nature of her misconduct and because the 
consequences outweighed any mitigating factors.  Id. at *9. 
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institution should be prepared to identify the threat and respond with ap-
propriate counter-measures. 
V. OPTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION ADMINISTRATORS AND LEGAL 
COUNSEL TO CONSIDER IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CAMPUS SECURITY 
EFFORT 
(1)  Colleges and universities should give careful consideration to the 
development of a systematic approach to campus safety and security.  Such 
an approach would advocate that campus safety and security is a pervasive 
responsibility that cuts across institutional departments and divisions cam-
pus-wide.  Campus safety and security can no longer be considered the 
parochial responsibility of the campus police department.  College cam-
puses are simply too vast in terms of facilities, programs, and personnel to 
expect a single unit to monitor any modern-day institution of higher learn-
ing.  Therefore, what is required is a pervasive mindset that all members of 
the college or university community have a responsibility to act in the best 
interest of the institution’s safety and security concerns.  Of course, cam-
pus police departments should be prepared to provide leadership in campus 
security efforts, but in cooperation with the larger campus community. 
(2)  Institutions should conduct internal audits regarding the defense 
mechanisms and tactics that are currently applied for safety and security 
purposes.  Colleges and universities should evaluate the methods used 
across campus to reduce an institution’s exposure to security breaches to 
determine whether existing approaches are effective.  Such internal exami-
nations may encourage cooperation throughout the campus and create op-
portunities to strengthen safety and security practices.  However, to the 
extent an institution discovers severe safety and security shortcomings, the 
college or university should be prepared to take prompt and immediate 
corrective action; failure to do so would expose the institution to increased 
liability because it would have had notice of the security concern. 
(3)  University executive, managerial, and other decision-making per-
sonnel should be well versed in the array of legal challenges that may be 
triggered by their actions, comments, and/or conduct.  In Johnson, for ex-
ample, prior to the fatal shooting of the student, the Dean of the Men’s 
Dormitory learned that the shooter was involved in a fight on campus ear-
lier the same evening and was given the license plate information of the 
shooter’s car.  Although the court found that the dean’s actions did not 
amount to a conscious indifference, the case demonstrates the opportunities 
an administrator may miss to prevent a tragedy.  The Johnson case illus-
trates the types of opportunities that college and university administrators 
may encounter to intervene in incidents that threaten campus safety.  Ad-
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ministrators familiar with elements of various tort claims, First Amend-
ment violations, and criminal violations are better prepared to make intelli-
gent decisions that may be required under time constraints or duress. 
(4)  The competition among colleges and universities for top students, 
talented faculty, financial gifts from donors, and corporate sponsorships is 
demanding and will probably become more intense in the years to come.  
In response, institutions have become increasingly sophisticated in their 
marketing strategies and promotional materials.  Colleges market their 
campuses as safe, inviting, pedestrian communities where students, faculty, 
parents, and guests are welcome and free to explore the institution’s aca-
demic, cultural, and artistic offerings.  These materials and documents 
should be reviewed to determine what obligations or duties they may cre-
ate for the college.  In Rhaney, the court pointed to a student’s Residence 
Hall Agreement as the controlling document to determine what duty the 
university owed to the student assaulted in his dormitory room.96  Hence, 
documents generated by the institution can serve important evidentiary 
purposes in litigation.  Therefore, legal counsel and administrators should 
at least jointly prepare guidelines to limit the institution’s exposure to legal 
liability.  
Arguably, a hallmark of institutions of higher education is that they 
provide an open, non-threatening environment for students and faculty to 
pursue important educational aims.  Unfortunately, colleges and universi-
ties have been—and probably will continue to be—targeted by elements of 
our society that do not cherish the aims of higher education, but view col-
lege campuses as an opportunity for wrongdoing.  In response, institutions 
must understand what legal duty is owed to the student community and 
aggressively address safety and security threats through sound administra-
tive policies and practices that comport with state and federal laws. 
 
  
 96. 880 A.2d 357, 367 (Md. 2005). 
